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Software repackaging is a common approach for creating malware. In this approach,
malware authors inject malicious payloads into legitimate applications; then, to ren-
der security analysis more difficult, they obfuscate most or all of the code. This forces
analysts to spend a large amount of effort filtering out benign obfuscated methods
in order to locate potentially malicious methods for further analysis. If an effective
mechanism for filtering out benign obfuscated methods were available, the number
of methods that must be analyzed could be reduced, allowing analysts to be more
productive. In this thesis, we introduce SEMEO, a highly effective and efficient fil-
tering approach that can determine whether an obfuscated and an original version of
a method are semantically equivalent. Our approach handles seven common, com-
plex types of obfuscation and can be effective even when all types are compositely
applied. In an empirical evaluation, we applied SEMEO to nine Android apps of
varying complexity, and the approach provided over 76% recall and 100% precision
in identifying semantically equivalent methods. We then performed three additional
studies, that showed that: (1) SEMEO is much more effective at identifying seman-
tically equivalent methods than FSquaDRA, an existing technique; (2) SEMEO is
also effective for identifying repackaged apps that have been previously obfuscated
by ProGuard, a popular obfuscation tool; and (3) SEMEO is effective at identifying
semantically equivalent methods in a repackaged, malicious version of Poke´mon Go.
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Introduction
Code obfuscation is a technique commonly used to render code difficult for humans
or analysis software to comprehend. Traditionally, developers used obfuscation to
protect code in its role as intellectual property. For example, most apps that can be
downloaded from Google Play are obfuscated by ProGuard [17]. However, increas-
ingly, obfuscation is also being used by malware authors to hide malicious payloads
through a process known as “repackaging” [42]. In repackaging, a legitimate applica-
tion is modified by adding code that performs malicious behavior. The application
is then obfuscated to make it difficult to locate the malicious code [6]. Currently,
repackaging (including its use of obfuscation) is the leading approach employed to
create Android malware [18]. In 2015, 2.3 million new malicious apps were uncovered
– a rate of one new malware every 13 seconds [14]. To combat malware effectively,
security analysts need techniques that can efficiently and effectively detect repackaged
malware. Because both benign and malicious apps are now commonly obfuscated,
these techniques must be able to cope with code obfuscation. In addition, analysts
need techniques that can effectively identify the locations of malicious code within
repackaged malware so that they can perform additional analysis to understand that
2code’s behavior and mitigate its effects. To accomplish these two goals, such tech-
niques must be able to handle sophisticated classes of obfuscation techniques including
code injection, code reordering, function indirection, function inlining and function
outlining [34].
Unfortunately, the most recent approaches presented for detecting repackaged
malware are not effective at identifying locations of malicious code. For example,
DroidMoss is effective at detecting repackaged malware. It has been used to inves-
tigate multiple market places for repackaged apps. The approach is based on fuzzy
hashing [41]. However, it is not effective when obfuscation techniques are used. Zhang
et al. [39] handle obfuscation by relying on high-level interconnections among user
interfaces (UIs), and Zhauniarovich et al. [40] use resource usage within the ana-
lyzed apps to detect differences between an original app and a suspected repackaged
app. Through reliance on UI interconnections and resource usage, these approaches
cope successfully with code obfuscation because they do not rely on code-level birth-
marks [28, 35] to perform detection. Instead, they relies on other birthmarks to detect
behavioral differences at the UI or resource usage levels. As such, they are effective
at detecting repackaged apps that are resource, UI, and event intensive. They are
ineffective, however, if the malicious code affects only functionalities and does not
cause UI or resource usage to change.
One way to render the process of analyzing repackaged malicious code more ef-
fective and efficient is to identify, from among all obfuscated code segments, those
that are semantically equivalent to the original, unobfuscated code. The code thus
identified does not need to be further analyzed, so this allows analysts to focus
on the code that remains. To accomplish this goal, researchers and practitioners
have attempted to apply deobfuscation techniques to obfuscated methods, and then
use “differencing” techniques to compare the deobfuscated versions to the originals
3(e.g., [3, 4, 5, 15, 16, 26]; Chapter 8 discusses this related work). This approach, how-
ever, has weaknesses. First, increasingly sophisticated obfuscation types are being
created, such as those that alter program structure, and these can hobble deobfus-
cators (Chapter 2 discusses this further). Second, even when deobfuscators are able
to function, they do not necessarily retrieve code matching the original code; instead
they focus on re-engineering code into a format that is more easily understood by
engineers.
In this thesis we explore an alternative approach. We present SEMEO, an ef-
fective and efficient technique for identifying methods in an obfuscated application
that are semantically equivalent to methods in an original application. The remain-
ing methods are potentially non-equivalent and analysts can focus on those. Our
approach differs from prior approaches in that, to our knowledge, it is the first to
attempt to directly identify (without first deobfuscating) obfuscated methods in An-
droid apps that are semantically equivalent to original non-obfuscated methods. SE-
MEO also handles a broad range of complex and widely used obfuscation techniques;
techniques that are currently being employed by authors of malware on Android apps
in particular.
We present the results of an empirical evaluation assessing the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of SEMEO, in which we applied it to nine Android apps of varying com-
plexity. Our evaluation reveals that the approach can achieve between 76% (when
five obfuscation types are compositely applied) and 100% (when one or two types
are applied) recall with respect to the numbers of obfuscated methods. Given a re-
call of 76%, analysts need to apply deobfuscation and further analysis techniques
only to the remaining 24% of the methods. In addition, modified methods misiden-
tified as semantically equivalent can be particularly damaging to security analysis as
they may be overlooked by analysts. In our empirical study, however, our approach
4achieved 100% precision (i.e., there was no misidentification of non-equivalent meth-
ods as equivalent) in all cases, even though each app considered was obfuscated in
325 different ways.
We also present the results of three additional empirical studies. In the first, we
compare SEMEO to FSquaDRA, an existing tool for detecting repackaged apps,
and we find that SEMEO is much more effective. In the second study, we apply a
second layer of obfuscation to the apps studied in our initial evaluation using Pro-
Guard; and our results show that even in this case, SEMEO remains highly effective,
while continuing to outperform FSquaDRA. In the third study, we apply SEMEO
to a repackaged, malicious version of the non-trivial real-world app, Poke´mon Go,
and again we find that SEMEO is effective.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides back-
ground information on Android Dalvik instructions and obfuscation techniques. Chap-
ter 3 describes SEMEO in detail, including its overall analysis workflow and detailed
algorithms for each of its steps. Chapter 4 describes our empirical study and an-
swers three research questions about our approach. Chapter 6 provides additional
discussion of our results. Chapter 7 presents results of our three additional empirical
studies. Chapter 8 discusses related work, and Chapter 9 concludes.
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Background
We next provide background information on the Android Runtime System, the DEX
instructions it relies on, and common obfuscation methods.
2.1 The Android Runtime System and DEX
Instructions
The Android software system consists of four layers: a Linux kernel, Libraries, an
Application Framework, and Applications. Android apps use either the Dalvik virtual
machine (VM) or Android Runtime (ART) environment to execute code in DEX
format.
DEX code is a register-based machine language. Each DEX method has its own
predefined number of virtual registers; these registers correspond to variables that can
store primitive types and object references. The execution engine stores the states of
method registers in an internal execution state stack, with the most current method’s
register on top of the stack. Because all the operations and computations performed
are register-based, all values must be loaded from and stored into class fields [2].
6Figure 2.1 presents an example of Android DEX instructions from the Android app
Dragon, obtained by applying a dexdump tool. The first line contains the pack-
age name (com.example.dragon), class name (MainActivity), and method name
(checkHiTone). This strictly follows JVM specifications[37]. Subsequent lines display
the offsets of each DEX instruction, then detailed instructions and register informa-
tion. The code shown first obtains a field from Lcom/example/dragon/Conditions
and stores it in register v0 via an sget. The code then compares the contents of
register v0 to the contents of register v1. A detailed explanation of DEX instructions
is provided in the Android specification [2].
Figure 2.1: Examples of DEX instructions
2.2 Obfuscation Methods
Rastogi et al. [34] classify common obfuscation techniques into three categories:
(1) trivial obfuscations, which can be easily detected by most antivirus tools; (2) DSA
obfuscations, which can be detected by static analysis techniques; and (3) NSA ob-
7fuscations, which cannot be detected by static analysis. In this thesis we focus on
DSA obfuscations. According to Rastogi et al. [34], most commercial antivirus tools
cannot cope with DSA obfuscations, as this class of obfuscations typically changes
the control flow and data flow of programs. We focus further on five specific classes
of DSA obfuscations: junk code insertion, code reordering, method indirection, func-
tion inlining and function outlining [8, 22, 23, 32, 38]. These five classes of DSA
obfuscations are those most commonly found in practice [34].
Junk code insertion involves the insertion of unnecessary code into an app. The
additional code may execute but does not affect the behavior of the program.
The three most common types of junk code insertion are nop insertion, branch
insertion and garbage code insertion. Nop insertion simply adds sequences of nop
instructions to the code; this obfuscation type is easy to detect and remove [23].
Branch insertion introduces branch instructions based on simple templates; for ex-
ample, branch predicates can be added that are always false so that the branches are
never actually taken. This obfuscation type may create additional dependencies in
control flow analysis [38]. Garbage insertion is also called dead code insertion; this
involves inserting instructions (other than nop instructions) that has no effect on the
semantics of the code [32].
Code reordering involves changing the execution order of statements or blocks of
code. This obfuscation type can be difficult to detect and remove. Because changing
the execution order of statements or blocks of code can affect the information flow in
a program it can also render it difficult to determine whether code thus obfuscated is
semantically equivalent to the original code. Figure 2.2 illustrates an application of
code reordering to the code of the Dragon app originally shown in Figure 2.1. The
original code tests whether the value in v0 is less-than-or-equal-to 2 in Lines 2 and 3,
8Figure 2.2: An illustration of code reordering
then tests whether the value of v1 is greater-than-or-equal-to 19 in Lines 7 and 9.
The reordered code reverses the order of these tests.
Method indirection inserts additional calls into an app, and is an obfuscation type
designed to manipulate call graphs. With this approach, a given method call (e.g.,
m0 → m1) can be converted to a call to a previously non-existing method (e.g., m2)
that then calls the originally called method; (e.g., yielding m0 → m2 → m1). The
technique is applicable to calls to framework libraries as well as calls to methods
within an app [22].
Function inlining replaces method calls with the actual body of called methods.
Normally used by compilers for optimization, this obfuscation type breaks abstraction
boundaries created by the programmer [8].
Function outlining is the inverse of function inlining; it involves decomposing a
function into multiple smaller functions. This process has been used (non-maliciously)
to remove duplicate code in large programs [22]; in the context of obfuscation, its
strength lies in requiring interprocedural analyses to perform deobfuscation.
9Chapter 3
Semantic Equivalence Analysis of
Obfuscated Code
We now present our approach for Semantic Equivalence Analysis of Obfuscated Code
(SEMEO). The key objective of SEMEO is to provide an efficient technique for
determining whether a method that has been obfuscated is semantically equivalent to
the original version of the method. Because a repackaged app typically includes only a
small set of methods that have been semantically altered to enact malicious behavior,
the majority of that app’s obfuscated methods will be equivalent to the original
unmodified methods. If our approach is effective, it should be able to identify a
larger percentage of these semantically equivalent methods, allowing security analysts
to focus on methods that cannot be conclusively identified as semantically equivalent.1
Figure 3.1 provides an architectural overview of SEMEO’s workflow. An analyst
provides two apps to SEMEO: an app P and a version P ′ of P that is suspected
to have been repackaged. SEMEO compares methods in P ′ (m′j) to methods in P
(mi). Note, however, that the mapping of methods in P
′ to methods in P may not
1In general, the problem of determining the semantic equivalence of two programs is undecid-
able [19], so our approach is necessarily an heuristic.
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Figure 3.1: Architectural overview of SEMEO
be one-to-one due to the use of obfuscation techniques that merge methods, extract
new ones, or make it difficult to determine which obfuscated methods correspond to
which original methods. Thus, the approach must account for this.
For example, suppose that P contains two methods, (m0 and m1), and suppose
that P ′, a repackaged version of P , contains three methods (m′0, m
′
1, and m
′
2). Sup-
pose that the additional method has been created by the use of a method outlining
obfuscation technique that splits m1 into m
′
1 and m
′
2. SEMEO begins by comparing
m0 to m
′
0. If they are not found to be semantically equivalent, it then compares m0
to m′1, and so on. If, on the other hand, they are found to be semantically equivalent
they are marked as such. SEMEO does not now need to visit m0 again; instead
it compares m1 with m
′
1. In this case in which the two modules are not semanti-
cally equivalent; m′1 now calls m
′
2 so the analysis needs to consider both methods
(m′1 +m
′
2) and then evaluates whether the combined result is semantically equivalent
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to m1. Similarly, if inlining is used to obfuscate two methods, there may be a situa-
tion in which two or more methods in P are, together, semantically equivalent to a
method in P ′.
When SEMEO completes its analysis, it outputs a list of methods that have been
determined to be semantically equivalent and not equivalent, and a percentage indi-
cating what proportion of the methods were determined to be semantically equivalent.
In the rest of this section we describe each step of the process in turn.
3.1 Preliminary Information
SEMEO operates on DEX instructions, and its goal is to identify DEX instructions
that can potentially change the semantic meaning of an app that uses them. Thus,
before presenting our approach we present information on these instructions. Ta-
ble 3.1 shows categories and examples of DEX instructions, derived from the Android
Specification [2]. Some of these classes of instructions cannot alter the semantics of
the app; these are shown in plain font at the end of the table.
As an example of an instruction that can change the semantics of an app, if a
cybercriminal modifies a method by injecting a few read instructions such as iget,
these instructions would perform field accesses and store the retrieved values into value
registers. These operations, in effect, overwrite these value registers with new and
potentially incorrect values, thus infecting the app. These values, however, remain
dormant until they are propagated via operations that use them as operands or store
them in other registers (e.g., move) or object fields (e.g., iput) that can be used
by others. We refer to instructions that can cause infection and propagation to be
“suspicious DEX instructions”, and these are the targets of our analysis. Other
instructions, shown in italics in Table 3.1, can also change the semantics of the app:
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Table 3.1: DEX Instruction Categories
Instruction Category Examples
Invoke invoke static, invoke virtual
Read iget, aget, sget
New new array, new instance
Array fill new array, fill array data
Write iput, aput, sput
Move move
Arithmetic op binary, unary operation
Branch if, go to, switch
Return return
Comparison if, ifz, cmp
Constant const wide, const, const string
Exception throw
No op nop
Casting check cast, instance of
Synchronization monitor enter, monitor exit
the write instruction, the new operation, and arithmetic operators are examples.
Notice that we classify throw instructions as one of those that cannot change the
semantics of a method. Exception handling occurs at runtime and modifying code by
adding throw instructions does not always change control flow – a change can occur
only if the exception occurs and is caught. Due to the dynamic nature of the throw
instruction, we consider it to be an instruction that does not change the semantics of
the code as part of our static analysis.
SEMEO compares a pair of apps at the method level. To support the necessary
analysis we created a tool to construct data flow and control flow graphs for the
instructions in each method, and method graphs to help track method calls. Data
flow are generated by using reaching definition algorithm, and the flow information
are based on def-use pair. We also created tools to construct class graphs and field
graphs (discussed later in this chapter). While it is possible to use existing program
analysis tools such as Soot to perform the required analyses, we chose to create
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tools that work directly with DEX to minimize the amount of translation that must
be performed and can potentially add another layer of complication to the obfuscated
code (e.g., DEX to Jimple for Soot) [25]. We provide a simple illustration of our
analysis graphs in Figure 3.2, which shows an instruction graph representing a method
with data flow information.
Figure 3.2: Example of an instruction graph with data flow information
3.2 Algorithms
We now describe the algorithms that comprise SEMEO. Algorithm 1 shows the
procedure that is applied to a pair of methods Mi and Mj. In Line 2, the algorithm
determines whether a method semantically equivalent to Mi has been previously
found. It does this using a map bit to represent the status for each method. If the
map bit for Mi is set, a semantically equivalent method in P
′ has already been found.
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Algorithm 1 Equivalence Analysis
1: procedure CheckEquivalence:(Mi,Mj′)
2: if (CheckMapBit(Mi) == false) then
3: Gi← ExtractDataFlow(Mi)
4: Sum1← ExtractInstructionSummary(Gi)
5: if (CheckMapBit(Mj′) == false) then
6: Gj ← ExtractDataFlow(Mj′)
7: Sum2← ExtractInstructionSummary(Gj)
8: if SummariesMatch(Sum1, Sum2) then
9: SetMappingFlag(Mi,Mj′)
10: end if
11: end if
12: end if
13: end procedure
If it is not set, the analysis continues (Line 3). The algorithm analyzes the data flow
graph for Mi (Line 3) and produces its instruction summary (Line 4).
Procedure ExtractInstructionSummary (called in Lines 4 and 7) traverses the
data flow graphs for each of the methods being considered using the DFS visitor
in the Boost graph library, a graph processing library available on most computing
platforms [1]. By using DFS visitor, SEMEO transverse each node in data flow
graph from entry point and check the suspicious instruction. Except ENTRY, each
node has an incoming edge with registers based on the data flow information. If
that incoming register is not in the path summary, then this incoming register will
be added into path summary. Path summary is a map to record the register and
its dex operation pair for each path. After that, SEMEO will check each node for
suspicious instruction, and update the path summary. When it visits the last node
of each path, it will combine current path summary into instruction summary, then
clear the current path summary and visit another new path. By running DFS visitor,
SEMEO traverse all paths on the data flow, extracting suspicious DEX instructions
and constructing an instruction summary for each method. As such, each instruction
summary contains only suspicious DEX instructions. Each instruction consists of
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three components: an opcode, registers and a constant value.
The information contained in an instruction summary represents the behavior of
a method but not its full structure. Each suspicious DEX instruction is a node in the
summary. Because DEX is a register-based instruction set, data flows via registers
and each flow of data can be represented as an edge between two nodes. Because
method arguments enter a method via entry registers set up by the caller, there are
no assignment edges coming into entry registers.
Turning again to the instruction graph in Figure 3.2, an argument is passed in to
the method through register v2, as indicated by the keyword ENTRY. There are three
instructions in this graph, invoke-static, move-result-object, and invoke-virtual.
All three instructions are classified as “suspicious DEX instructions” and thus they
are included in the summary.
In Line 5, the algorithm checks whether Mj′ has already been determined to be
semantically equivalent to an original method. If not, the algorithm extracts its data
flow graph and associated instruction summary (Lines 7-8). Now, both summary sets
are compared (Line 8) and if they are semantically equivalent, a map bit is set for
(Mi, Mj).
The analysis of an instruction summary proceeds as follows. First, the analysis
looks for invoke instructions in the summary. In the DEX instruction set, invoke
is used to perform method calls. Obfuscation techniques such as method indirec-
tion, function inlining and function outlining use invoke instructions to perform
obfuscation by making additional method calls. To handle this situation, our tech-
nique, as shown in Algorithm 2, performs an interprocedural analysis of the caller
and callee methods to perform summary inlining. For each previously computed
summary, whenever there is an invoke instruction (Line 3), the algorithm visits the
callee method (Line 4) and checks whether that method has ever been inlined with
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Algorithm 2 Summary Inlining
1: procedure inlining(Sum, Inlined)
2: for each instruction Ins in Sum do
3: if Ins is “invoke” then
4: M ← GetCalleeMethod(Ins)
5: if NotInList(M ,Inlined) then
6: Inlined← Inlined ∪ M
7: G← ExtractDataFlow(M)
8: Sumi ← ExtractInstructionSummary(G)
9: Sum← Sum ∪ Sumi
10: Sum← Sum− Ins
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: end procedure
the caller’s summary (Line 5). If it has, the analysis has been done previously and
the algorithm terminates. If it has not, the algorithm uses the DFS visitor method
to compute an instruction summary for that callee method (Lines 5 to 8). Finally, it
merges the result with the summary of the caller method (Line 9). This process also
applies when a callee method makes calls to other methods. After merging summary
information, the algorithm removes the invoke instruction from the caller’s summary
(Line 10). This process is repeated until there are no more invoke instructions in
either the caller’s or callee’s summaries.
In the scenario presented earlier in our example, method outlining has been used
to obfuscate P to create P ′. In this case, m1 has been obfuscated to create m′1 and m
′
2
through outlining. Algorithm 2 first analyzes the summary of m′1 to identify invoke
instructions. In this case, there is one invoke call to m′2. Since this is the first time
this summary has been analyzed, the algorithm creates a summary of m′2 and merges
it with that of m′1. The combined summary is then compared to that of m1.
After performing summary inlining, SEMEO compares the summaries to de-
termine whether they are semantically equivalent. The comparison process applies
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several heuristics. For example, by using the instruction summary, the algorithm can
remove all junk code that has been inserted without changing the semantics of the
program. This is because our “suspicious DEX instructions” already cover a wide
range of semantics-changing instructions. However, considering just these suspicious
instructions is not sufficient. Obfuscation approaches such as those that change loop
structures would cause the instructions and data-flow patterns to change. To handle
this, we also refer to common loop patterns and look for cases where a pattern has
been changed to another equivalent pattern. We then perform template matching to
see if the obfuscation is simply changing the loop structure. For example, for loops
and while loops may have the same semantic meanings in different flow structures. To
handle this, by traversing the data flow in both situations, our DFS visitor will check
all possible conditions and include suspicious DEX instructions into the instruction
summary until it reaches a fixed point. As our instruction summary only involves
in register information and DEX instructions, the structural difference will not affect
our result.
Sum and Sumi are lists of maps, where each map stores the register and suspicious
DEX instructions from the previous DFS visitor execution. The next step is to
compare both instruction summaries. To handle code reordering, we sort Sum and
Sumi alphabetically in terms of their DEX instructions before beginning to compare
them. Instruction reordering is difficult to analyze if we retain the order of the
instructions as found in the summary. Sorting takes care of this concern as order is
no longer preserved based on when instructions appear in the method. Instead, we
preserve relationships through data flow information. After comparing instructions
and data flow information, our approach analyzes constant values, which may provide
additional insights as some constant values including strings may not change as they
provide specific information for the methods (e.g., URL strings, constant integers).
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After visiting all of the methods in both apps, SEMEO examines the analysis
result obtained for the obfuscated app and then calculates the percentage of methods
in the obfuscated app found to be semantically equivalent to those in the original
app. If this number is less than 100%, SEMEO outputs the names of all methods in
the obfuscated app that are not found to be semantically equivalent to methods in
the original app.
The complexity of the comparison process as represented in Algorithm 1 is O(n2)
in the worst case, and O(n) in the best case, where n is the larger of the number of
methods in P and P ′.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Study
To evaluate SEMEO we conducted an empirical study, considering the following
research questions.
RQ1. How effective is SEMEO at detecting whether an app and a semantically
equivalent obfuscated version of that app are in fact semantically equivalent?
RQ2. How effective is SEMEO at identifying repackaged methods in obfuscated
apps?
RQ3. How efficient is SEMEO?
4.1 Objects of Analysis
To answer these research questions, we wished to obtain several Android apps of
varying complexities, for which Java source code and build procedures were available.
Ultimately, we selected nine apps; Table 4.1 provides details. Column 1 provides an
app number that is used later, Column 2 provides the app name, Column 3 lists the
number of methods in each app, and Column 4 lists the number of lines of code.1 (We
1Lines of code were counted manually by adding up the total lines of source code for each file,
as reported in the Eclipse IDE.
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Table 4.1: Applications
Modified
App Name Methods LOC Methods
1 PicViewer 21 139 2
2 CalcC 63 462 6
3 DeviceAdmin2 161 1675 20
4 Orienteering 697 10246 20
5 SysMon 752 3490 18
6 Pondl 1573 20664 99
7 YARR 2027 1224 57
8 NewsCollator 2935 3535 19
9 TextSecure 7218 37486 243
discuss the rightmost column later.) These apps were created by DARPA to support
their Automated Program Analysis for Cybersecurity (APAC) program [13]. As the
table shows, the apps ranged in size from 21 to 7218 methods, and from 139 to 37,486
lines of code as reported by Eclipse IDE.
We considered the seven DSA obfuscation types discussed in Chapter 3; these are
listed in Table 4.2, where we provide a “Type ID” for use in subsequent references, and
the name of the obfuscation. Most of these obfuscation types are known to be difficult
for deobfuscation tools to handle. To apply the first five obfuscation types (T1-T5)
we used Alan [27], an Android malware obfuscation engine capable of applying one
or more of these types to a given app in any order. Alan can be configured to
obfuscate only a portion of an app or the entire app. We chose to obfuscate entire
apps to create a scenario similar to the one created by malware authors when they
repackage apps.
We were unable to find any tool support for the function inlining and outlining
obfuscation types (T6 and T7), so for these we enlisted the help of an undergraduate
student who at that time had no knowledge of our approach for determining semantic
equivalence. Where inlining is concerned, we instructed the student to inline string
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Table 4.2: Obfuscation Types
Type ID Obfuscation Name
T1 insert nop operation
T2 insert branch
T3 insert garbage
T4 reorder code
T5 method indirect
T6 function inlining
T7 function outlining
operations and the contents of called methods. Where outlining is concerned, we
instructed the student to group branch condition bodies into other methods and to
move some parts of functions into other small functions. The student applied these
modifications to randomly selected methods from each of the apps. We then consid-
ered instances in which just inlining, just outlining, or both were applied. Table 4.3
provides information on the numbers of methods inlined and outlined. The table
provides the app number and name in Columns 1 and 2, together with the number of
methods on which inlining, outlining, and both (“hybrid”) were performed for each
app (Columns 3 through 5, respectively).
Table 4.3: Numbers of Inlined and Outlined Methods
Inlined Outlined Inlined+Outlined
App Name Methods Methods Methods
1 PicViewer 2 2 2
2 CalcC 6 6 6
3 DeviceAdmin2 10 16 10
4 Orienteering 20 20 20
5 SysMon 10 10 10
6 Pondl 10 10 10
7 YARR 2 2 2
8 NewsCollator 2 2 2
9 TextSecure 10 10 10
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Alan is able to apply obfuscation types T1 - T5 individually or in any combina-
tions, so we chose five different methods for grouping obfuscation types (Table 4.4).
Grouping G1 considers single obfuscation types; since there are five obfuscation types
this yields cases in which just obfuscation type T1 is applied, cases in which just obfus-
cation type T2 is applied, and so forth. Grouping G2 considers all pairs of obfuscation
types; “T12” refers to the case in which obfuscation type T1 is applied followed by
obfuscation type T2. The order in which obfuscations are applied also matters, so
we considered all sequences of pairs (e.g., we also considered “T21”). In the case
of Grouping G2, then, a total of 20 different sequences of obfuscations are applied.
Similar reasoning applies to Groupings G3, G4, and G5, which involve all possible
sequences of applications of all possible combinations of three, four, and five obfus-
cation types, respectively. For function inlining and outlining, we applied each singly
and applied both together; thus, there are three different sequences of applications of
these obfuscation types, which we refer to as G6 through G8.
Table 4.4: Obfuscation Type Groupings
Grouping Example Grouping and Sequence Number
G1 T1, T2, T3, T4, T5 5
G2 T12, T23, T34, T45, T21... 20
G3 T123, T345, T251, T231... 60
G4 T1234, T1245, T4213... 120
G5 T12345, T12453, T45213... 120
G6 T6 1
G7 T7 1
G8 T6+T7 1
To address RQ2 we require repackaged apps. Ultimately, when considering mal-
ware, we are interested in methods into which malicious code has been injected, and
to which obfuscations have then been applied. Finding suitable malware samples
that meet our requirements for objects of study, however, is challenging. For ex-
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ample, many malware samples that have been used in academic research are quite
old, and they often are not available with source code, which is needed to perform
obfuscation. In addition, we also require the source code of the original as well as
the repackaged apps for our studies. Finally, finding numbers of modified methods
containing malware that are adequate to support any quantitative conclusions about
the effectiveness of our approach would likely not be possible.
For these reasons, for the purpose of this initial study, we chose to modify our
objects of analysis ourselves. (In Chapter 7 we present a case study in which we apply
our approach to an app that does contain actual malware). This gave us the ability to
use versions of methods that have been semantically modified in diverse manners, in
numbers sufficient to support quantitative conclusions. We asked an undergraduate
student to perform this task. To do this, for each app, prior to applying any obfus-
cation types to the apps, he randomly selected a number of methods and manually
modified their code. Modifications involved relatively simple but provably semantics-
affecting changes such as negating branch conditions, changing input parameters,
removing method contents, and changing return type. While these modifications do
not involve insertions of malicious code, we argue that such code would most likely
be more complicated than these modifications; thus, if SEMEO is able to correctly
deduce that our modified methods are indeed semantically different from the original
methods, it is likely to be able to do so for methods involving actual malicious code,
where the changes are more extensive. The numbers of modified methods created
and used in our study are shown in the rightmost column of Table 4.1.
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4.2 Variables and Measures
4.2.1 Independent Variables
Because SEMEO may perform differently on different obfuscation type groupings
and we wish to assess such differences in performance, we treat obfuscation type
groupings as an independent variable. As noted earlier, our groupings consider each
of the obfuscation types separately, while also considering all possible sequences of
the obfuscation types that are supported by Alan.
4.2.2 Dependent Variables
As dependent variables, we chose metrics appropriate to our research questions, as
follows.
Recall. For RQ1 and RQ2 we measure recall, which represents SEMEO’s ability to
identify semantically equivalent methods. Recall is calculated as mseq
mtotal−mmod , where
mtotal represents the total number of methods in an app; mmod represents the number
of modified methods in the app; and mseq represents the number of methods in the
app identified as semantically equivalent. In the case of RQ1, we use apps that have
been obfuscated but not modified, so in this case mmod equals 0. For RQ2 recall is
calculated using the same equation but in this case the apps have been modified, so
mmod is non-zero.
Precision. Precision represents SEMEO’s ability not to mis-identify methods as
semantically equivalent that are not in fact semantically equivalent. Modified meth-
ods mis-identified as semantically equivalent can be particularly damaging to secu-
rity analysis as they may be overlooked. For RQ1, where we do not have modified
methods, the notion of precision does not apply. For RQ2, however, we do have
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modified methods, so in that case we also calculate precision. We calculate precision
as mseq−mneq
mseq
, where mseq represents the number of methods in the app identified as
semantically equivalent, and mneq represents the number of modified methods that
have been mistakenly identified as semantically equivalent to methods in the original
app.
Efficiency. We calculate efficiency by measuring the time required by SEMEO to
perform its analysis. We use seconds to report our results. The measurement begins
at the time we load the two apps and ends when the analysis result is reported.
4.2.3 Study Operation
To address RQ1, we use SEMEO to compare the obfuscated apps with the original
apps, and note how many methods in the obfuscated apps are flagged as semantically
equivalent to the original ones. To address RQ2 we apply the same process, but in
this case we also note how the results relate to methods that were actually modified.
To address RQ3 we follow the same process as for RQ1 and measure the amount of
time needed to perform the analysis.
To perform this study we used a MacBook Pro running OS X El Capitan version
10.11.2, with an 8GB memory and a 2.5GHz Intel Core i5. The performance times
we gather are from within this environment.
4.3 Threats to Validity
External validity concerns the extent to which results may generalize. Where exter-
nal validity is concerned, we have studied only nine apps, but they do represent an
important sub-class of the apps that malware authors target, and they do vary in
size and complexity. Further, two of our obfuscation types, inlining and outlining,
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were applied by hand. Additional studies are needed to address these threats. We
also do not consider actual malware, instead using semantic modifications made by
a programmer. One of the further studies we present in Chapter 7, however, helps
address this threat by considering an application that does contain actual malware.
Internal validity concerns whether the observed results can in fact be attributed
to differences among the choices of independent variables. Where internal validity
is concerned, errors in the tools we rely on could affect our results, but we have
attempted to rigorously test them.
Construct validity concerns the extent to which the measures utilized capture
the true costs and values associated with an approach. Where construct validity is
concerned, we measure precision, recall, and analysis time, but we do not collect any
measures related to actual engineer effort.
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Chapter 5
Results
We now report the results of our empirical evaluation, discussing each research ques-
tion in turn.
5.1 RQ1
RQ1 concerns the effectiveness of SEMEO at detecting whether an app and a seman-
tically equivalent obfuscated version of that app are in fact semantically equivalent.
Figure 5.1 presents boxplots showing the distribution of recall values achieved by SE-
MEO for obfuscation type groupings G1 through G5 on all nine apps. In the figure,
the x-axis organizes the data per app. For each app, five boxes display the data for
obfuscation type groupings G1 through G5, respectively. Thus, the leftmost box in
each set of five represents App 1 with obfuscation type grouping G1, the next box to
the right represents App 1 with obfuscation type grouping G2, and so forth. Each
individual box represents the data for a given obfuscation type grouping across all
sequences used for that grouping. That is, T12, T21, T31, and others are all part of
G2, and their values on App 1 are all included in the data from which the second box
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Figure 5.1: Recall for obfuscation type groupings G1-G5 on RQ1 Apps
from the left was generated). The y-axis reports recall percentages, computed using
the equation provided in Section 4. The mean value within each group is denoted by
a “+”.
As the boxplots illustrate, for each app, as obfuscation complexity increases, mean
recall also decreases. For obfuscation type grouping G1, in seven of nine cases there
is little variance in results, and the mean recall values are between 95% and 100%,
indicating that with single obfuscations applied, SEMEO is highly effective at iden-
tifying semantically equivalent methods. Even when the obfuscations applied are the
most complex (obfuscation type grouping G5) the mean recall exceeds 80% on eight
out of nine apps. The lowest mean recall (76%) occurs on App 5 for obfuscation type
grouping G5. Larger variance in results occurs most often on obfuscation type group-
ings G2 and G3; in five of nine cases these are the only obfuscation type groupings
that display large degrees of variance. This suggests that when only two or three
types of obfuscations are applied they can interact in a wider variety of ways that
impact SEMEO’s performance more than when larger numbers are applied.
For function inlining and outlining (G6-G8), the recall data is presented in Ta-
ble 5.1. (Boxplots are not appropriate in this case, because we do not use multiple
permutations of obfuscation technique orderings in this case, and thus do not have a
distribution of data points). For these obfuscation type groupings, recall ranges from
80.56% to 100%.
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Table 5.1: Recall for Obfuscation Type Groupings T6, T7 and T6+T7 on RQ1 Apps
Grouping App 1 App 2 App 3 App 4 App 5 App 6 App 7 App 8 App 9 Average
G6 90.48 95.45 94.41 95.25 100 89.92 100 99.52 83.33 94.26
G7 91.3 95.52 90.96 94.41 99.61 95.77 99.86 99.9 83.72 94.56
G8 82.61 80.56 91.72 94.24 99.61 91.14 99.95 99.8 83.22 91.43
SEMEO achieved average recall values ranging from 91.43% to 94.56%. The
somewhat lower recall values in this case attest to the difficulty of determining se-
mantic equivalence in the presence of substantial changes in program structure.
5.2 RQ2
RQ2 concerns the effectiveness of SEMEO at identifying repackaged methods in
obfuscated apps. We apply all seven obfuscation types listed in Table 4.2 in RQ2 as
well, under the same sets of obfuscation types groupings.
Figure 5.2 reports recall values for obfuscation type groupings G1 through G5.
SEMEO achieved average levels of recall ranging from 69% to 100%. For App 2,
App 3, App 5, and App 6, the recall values for RQ2 are lower than those in RQ1.
The reductions range from 20% for App 2 to about 10% for the other apps.
Table 5.2 displays the recall values for SEMEO for obfuscation type groupings
G6-G8. Again, changes in program structure make determining semantic equivalence
more challenging. As shown, the average recall value for each of the three obfuscation
type groupings is reduced by 5% compared to that of the corresponding obfuscation
type groupings in RQ1. The greatest decrease in recall occurs on App 2, which is a
small app.
Turning to precision, SEMEO achieved 100% precision on all apps repackaged
with all obfuscation types and obfuscation type groupings. This means that none of
the modified methods were mistakenly identified as semantically equivalent.
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Figure 5.2: Recall for obfuscation type groupings G1-G5 on RQ2 Apps
Table 5.2: Recall for Obfuscation Type Groupings G6-G8 on RQ2 Apps
Grouping App 1 App 2 App 3 App 4 App 5 App 6 App 7 App 8 App 9 Average
G6 84.21 48.61 88.98 98.23 99.18 82.45 81.64 87.5 90.69 84.61
G7 72.73 70.49 77.24 95.7 97.08 81.46 80.84 86.98 90.69 83.69
G8 72.73 48.53 80.56 98.08 97.61 80.59 80.84 86.94 90.69 81.84
5.3 RQ3
RQ3 concerns the efficiency of SEMEO. Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 show mean per-
formance values for SEMEO, gathered on runs with the apps used for RQ1 and RQ2,
for the five obfuscation type groupings G1-G5. In both figures, the results for Apps 1
through 7 are similar. The results for Apps 8 and 9 show increasing analysis times.
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Figure 5.3: Performance of SEMEO on obfuscation type groupings G1-G5 on RQ1
Apps (seconds)
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 show the performance values for SEMEO for the inlining,
outlining, and hybrid obfuscation type groupings.
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Table 5.3: Performance of SEMEO on Obfuscation Type Groupings G6-G8 on RQ1
Apps (Seconds)
Grouping App 1 App 2 App 3 App 4 App 5 App 6 App 7 App 8 App 9
G6 0.27 0.31 0.47 2.14 1.02 125 7.36 26.95 6808.98
G7 0.29 0.29 0.46 2.33 1.07 55.88 9.24 27.24 7113.36
G8 0.57 0.4 0.58 2.47 1.13 117.99 8.09 21.21 6056
Table 5.4: Performance of SEMEO on Obfuscation Type Groupings G6-G8 on RQ2
Apps (Seconds)
Grouping App 1 App 2 App 3 App 4 App 5 App 6 App 7 App 8 App 9
G6 0.31 0.57 1.05 3.41 2.71 236.91 403.91 813.11 6570.87
G7 0.38 0.45 0.9 12.15 3.62 246.06 419.63 855.74 6738.51
G8 0.34 0.62 1.29 2.76 3.84 259.06 414.03 818.56 6506.24
As the data shows, SEMEO can be quite efficient when the number of methods
it needs to analyze is of small to moderate size. Only as the number of methods in
an app neared 3000 (App 8) did execution time from 34 seconds to 1267 seconds (21
minutes). In the case of App 9, which has over 7000 methods, the analysis time ranged
from 203.46 seconds to 12693.6 seconds (2.7 hours). Note that SEMEO is much faster
when the pair of original and obfuscated apps to be analyzed are semantically the
same. As shown in Table 5.1, App 7 and App 8 have nearly 100% recall for RQ1.
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In this case, the analysis times are also quite fast (less than 30 seconds as shown
in Table 5.3) in spite of the presence of over 2000 methods. However, for RQ2 as
shown in Table 5.2, the recall values for App 7 and App 8 decrease to 80% and
86%, respectively, due to the presence of modified methods. In this case, the analysis
time also increases to 400 seconds and 850 seconds, respectively (see Table 5.4).
The performance overhead in these cases arises primarily due to the complexity of
Algorithm 1 (O(n2)).
For RQ2, we report performance results for SEMEO on obfuscation type group-
ings G1-G5 in Figure 5.4. Table 5.4 shows mean performance values for SEMEO
for the inlining and outlining obfuscation type groupings of RQ2. Similar to the case
with RQ1, larger apps experience higher runtime overheads. However, the amount of
time required to perform equivalence analysis on a repackaged app is generally the
same as the time required to analyze the same apps for RQ1.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
Based on our results, some methods in obfuscated apps are incorrectly deemed by
SEMEO to be non-equivalent to those in the original apps. There are various reasons
behind such misidentifications. First, SEMEO analyzes obfuscation grouping types
G1 and G2 very accurately because these are not as complex as G3, G4, and G5. The
majority of lower recall values occur on groupings G4 and G5, where four and five
layers of obfuscation have been applied. Such high degrees of composite obfuscation
makes analyzing apps for semantic equivalence more challenging.
Our analysis involves register comparisons when comparing the DEX instructions
of two methods. However, when the method inlining and outlining techniques are
used, we require interprocedural analysis. Additional methods can cause the register
assignments performed by the compiler to change. In this case, SEMEO would
report these methods as not semantically equivalent, which means that the apps need
to be further analyzed to verify whether they are indeed semantically different. As
such, our design errs toward being more conservative; however, the recall numbers
still show that the number of methods that must be analyzed represents only a small
fraction of the number of total methods for each app. For example, our largest app
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has 11,174 methods after obfuscation. Our analysis leaves only 15% of these methods
for analysis.
While SEMEO does mistakenly identify some semantically equivalent methods
as non-equivalent, it did not, in the cases we considered, mistakenly identify modified
methods as semantically equivalent. This means that in these cases, the approach
would not allow modified methods to escape analysis. We also discovered that when
we introduce modified methods that change application semantics, our recall degrades
slightly. This is because these modified methods can affect some superclass and
subclass relationships. Some modifications to global variables in the modified methods
can also affect other methods that share these global variables. These scenarios can
cause SEMEO to identify some equivalent methods as non-equivalent. Still, the
approach filters outs a large portion of equivalent methods, leaving only a small
percentage of methods to be analyzed. The amount of additional overhead spent on
dealing with these complexities is also very small as the reported time for RQ2 is
about the same as the reported time for RQ1, for the same app.
To scale SEMEO to handle larger apps, significant reengineering efforts will be
required. For example, additional heuristics might be able to reduce the complexity
of Algorithm 1. One option is to first sort all the methods based on size to allow
searches to be more localized based on size. Other heuristics that may facilitate faster
searching would be to partition methods based on method signatures, input/output
flows, and the types of calls they make to libraries.
Obfuscation techniques that try to alter library calls can be complex and would
likely affect the semantics of apps. As such, they are not likely to be used so re-
lying on them as a way to help partition similar methods to allow searching to be
applied to smaller data sets or support searching in parallel can reduce the cost of our
approach. Because SEMEO is based on graphs that can be processed by the Boost
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Graph Library, we also plan to explore existing graph algorithms such as isomorphism
testing [36] that may help reduce the analysis overhead.
36
Chapter 7
Additional Case Studies
In this chapter, we report the results of three additional studies designed to evalu-
ate the accuracy and performance of SEMEO under realistic settings. In the first
study, we compare the accuracy of SEMEO with that of an alternative approach
for detecting repackaged apps. In the second study, we apply SEMEO to detect
semantically equivalent methods when ProGuard, a commonly used commercial
obfuscation tool, is used in addition to our adopted obfuscation methods. In the
third study, we use SEMEO to detect modified methods in a complex, real-world
repackaged malware sample.
7.1 Comparing SEMEO to an Existing
Alternative Technique
We now consider other techniques that can detect repackaged Android applications in
the presence of code obfuscation. We examinedViewDroid [39] and FSquaDRA [40].
ViewDroid uses UI-based birthmarks to help detect differences in UI connections be-
tween an original app and a repackaged app. Unfortunately, ViewDroid is not pub-
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licly available. FSquaDra uses resource-usage-based birthmarks to detect repack-
aged apps. Specifically, it looks for identical resources that are present in the orig-
inal app and the potentially repackaged app. According to reported results [40],
FSquaDRA is efficient and accurate in detecting repackaged apps. FSquaDRA is
also publicly available. Thus, we compare the performance of SEMEO to that of
FSquaDRA.
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 provide data on the use of FSquaDRA to identify semantically
equivalent methods in the apps used in our initial study for RQ1 and RQ2, respec-
tively. Each app was individually obfuscated with obfuscation grouping types G1, G6,
and G7 (hence, we applied all seven obfuscation types, T1 to T7). Our goal was to
observe whether the underlying analysis approaches used by these two approaches are
sensitive to these obfuscation types. We compared the recall performance of SEMEO
with that of FSquaDRA for these obfuscation groupings.
Recall that for RQ1 our apps were obfuscated but not modified. As such, the
number of semantically equivalent methods should be 100%. As Table 7.1 shows,
however, the average recall performances of FSquaDRA on these apps ranged from
19.05% to 43.48% when obfuscation type grouping G1 was applied. SEMEO, in
contrast was able to achieve recall performances across all nine apps ranging from
95% to 100% in this case (as shown by the boxes representing G1 in Figure 5.1).
When inlining (grouping G6) and outlining (grouping G7) were applied, FSquaDRA
achieved higher recall values than on obfuscation type grouping G1, ranging from
38.12% to 95.74% with an average of 76.09%. SEMEO, on the other hand, was able
to achieve recall performances ranging from 80.56% to 100% with an average above
91.43% in this case(see Table 5.1).
For the set of apps that were modified and then obfuscated (used to answer RQ2),
FSquaDRA was able to achieve recall performances ranging from 19.04% to 42.86%
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Table 7.1: Recall of FSquaDRA Using RQ1 Apps
Grouping App 1 App 2 App 3 App 4 App 5 App 6 App 7 App 8 App 9 Average
G1 37.5 20 42.86 43.48 19.05 37.78 25 23.08 43.04 32.42
G6 69.23 63.6 95.74 77.78 92.31 93.75 76.47 77.78 38.12 76.09
G7 69.23 63.6 95.74 77.78 92.31 93.75 76.47 77.78 38.12 76.09
Table 7.2: Recall of FSquaDRA Using RQ2 Apps
Grouping App 1 App 2 App 3 App 4 App 5 App 6 App 7 App 8 App 9 Average
G1 37.5 20 42.86 42.85 20 19.04 25 23.08 42.32 30.29
G6 69.23 63.63 95.74 95.74 92.31 93.75 76.47 77.78 21.8 76.27
G7 69.23 63.63 95.74 95.74 92.31 93.75 76.47 77.78 21.8 76.27
when obfuscation type grouping G1 was applied (see Table 7.2). SEMEO, in contrast,
achieved recall performances ranging ranging from 75% to 100% (boxes representing
G1 in Figure 5.2). For obfuscation type groupings G6 and G7, FSquaDRA’s recall
ranged from 21.8% to 95.74% with average of 76.27%. SEMEO, on the other hand,
achieved recall performances ranging from 48.53% to 99.18% with an average above
81.84%(see Table 5.2).
The results we present for FSquaDRA do not include those for composite obfus-
cation (obfuscation type groupings G2-G5). This is because when we applied these
groupings, we found that the recall performance of FSquaDRA was not sensitive
to the differences in groupings. We believe that the approaches used to create com-
posite obfuscation groupings in our study do not change resource usage, which is the
main analysis criterion utilized by FSquaDRA. In contrast, SEMEO’s recall per-
formance is sensitive to these different approaches: under all approaches, SEMEO
is significantly more accurate than FSquaDRA at detecting semantically equivalent
methods.
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7.2 Applying SEMEO on Apps Obfuscated by
ProGuard
We next sought to assess whether SEMEO can identify semantically equivalent meth-
ods in apps that have been obfuscated by ProGuard, an obfuscation tool for An-
droid. ProGuard is commonly used to protect intellectual property. Obfuscation
through ProGuard is applicable within the Android Studio IDE.
To perform our evaluation, we chose apps that we can successfully apply Pro-
Guard to; these include six of the apps used in our initial study. In this case, we
utilized apps that contain modifications (the apps used to answer RQ2). We first
applied ProGuard to the source code. Then, we applied obfuscation grouping G1
(individual obfuscation types) and obfuscation grouping G5 (composite obfuscation
types). Table 7.3 lists the numbers of modified methods used, and recall values in-
volved, when SEMEO and FSquaDra were used in these cases.
Note that once we applied ProGuard to an app, the structure of the app can
change. For example, Proguard removes dead code and performs some optimization
including inlining. As such, we had to reapply Alan after an app that has been
obfuscated by ProGuard. This caused the number of modified methods for each
app to be different than those listed in Table 4.1 due to changes to the program
structure.
As Table 7.3 shows, SEMEO was more effective than FSquaDRA at detecting
semantically equivalent methods when two or more layers of obfuscations (ProGuard
followed by our own additional obfuscation types) were applied. SEMEO achieved
recall values ranging from 52.02% to 94.87% when two layers of obfuscations were
applied (e.g., ProGuard and an obfuscation type in G1), with the average recall
value of 79.04%. When six layers of obfuscations were applied (i.e., ProGuard and
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Table 7.3: Recall Results (%) Achieved by SEMEO and FSquaDRA When Apply-
ing ProGuard on Obfuscation Type Grouping G1 and G5
Modified G1 G5
Apps Methods Semeo FSquaDRA Semeo FSquaDRA
App 1 3 73.34 37.50 55.56 37.50
App 2 8 52.02 20.00 51.40 20.00
App 3 10 68.47 42.86 64.74 42.86
App 6 10 94.87 37.78 91.31 37.78
App 7 11 94.36 25.00 84.11 25.00
App 8 10 91.18 23.08 91.05 23.08
Average 79.04 31.04 73.03 31.04
G5), SEMEO achieved recall values ranging from 51.40% to 91.31% with an average
recall value of 73.03%. FSquaDRA, on the other hand, achieved recall values rang-
ing from 20% to 42.86% with an average of 31.04%. Further, as noted in Section 7.1,
FSquaDRA was not sensitive to differences in obfuscation type groupings.
Table 7.4 reports the analysis times observed in this study. FSquaDRA was
consistently much faster than SEMEO. In the case of App 8, when G1 was ap-
plied, FSquadra was more than 200 times faster than SEMEO. This is because
FSquaDRA’s resource usage analysis is much faster than our analysis, which must
analyze code-level birthmarks that have been obfuscated. Despite being much slower,
however, SEMEO produced much more precise analysis results in an amount of time
that is not unreasonable: the longest analysis time we observed was just over 30
seconds.
Table 7.4: Analysis Times (Seconds) Required by SEMEO and FSquaDRA When
Applying ProGuard on Obfuscation Type Grouping G1 and G5
G1 G5
Apps Semeo FSquaDRA Semeo FSquaDRA
App 1 1.92 0.10 0.70 0.11
App 2 6.56 0.10 2.74 0.15
App 3 8.54 0.15 4.07 0.19
App 6 19.98 0.13 21.94 0.11
App 7 5.80 0.13 3.91 0.11
App 8 33.00 0.16 18.86 0.11
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7.3 Identifying Semantically Equivalent Methods
in Real-World Repackaged Malware
Within a week of official release of Poke´mon Go in the US, several repackaged ma-
licious versions of the app were distributed through the third party stores. In coun-
tries that have no access to Google Play, third party stores are the main distribution
channels by which Android users obtain apps. Furthermore, popular games such as
Poke´mon Go had different release dates in different countries, so many users who
could not wait for the official release date in their countries downloaded the app from
third party stores. Many of these stores, however, are less rigorous than Google Play
when it comes to vetting submitted apps for security vulnerabilities. Moreover, three
instances of repackaged Poke´mon Go malware have been made available for download
from Google Play [9, 12].
Typically, popular apps attract the attention of cyber-criminals because they are
highly downloaded, and thus, repackaged versions unknowingly downloaded by users
can infect a large number of devices quickly. For example, one version of Poke´mon
Go was repackaged with a Remote Access Tool or RAT. For this particular app,
the malware author downloaded the legitimate version that had been obfuscated
using ProGuard. The malware author modified the app to contain a RAT tool
called DroidJack, which allows cyber criminals to remotely take control of infected
devices [20, 31]. The presence of this malicious version of the app was first detected
three days after its official release.
In this case study, we investigated the effectiveness of SEMEO at identifying the
repackaged components in this repackaged release of Poke´mon Go. The legitimate
version contains 37,024 methods while the repackaged version contains 38,878 meth-
ods. We used information from a security analysis result [20] to identify the methods
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that had been modified or added. In total, there were 1,854 such methods. We then
used SEMEO to analyze both versions of the app. SEMEO found 95.23% of the
methods in the two versions of the app to be equivalent. The remaining 4.77% of
methods are in fact all the modified methods that have been previously reported [20].
The analysis time was approximately 2,300 seconds. We also used FSquaDRA to
analyze these two versions of Poke´mon Go. FSquaDRA found 89.47% of the meth-
ods to be similar. This lower accuracy translates to 2,240 additional methods that a
security analyst needs to analyze because they are reported as not equivalent.
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Chapter 8
Related work
We have already discussed ViewDroid [39] and FSquaDRA [40], and presented
results comparing SEMEO to the latter of these. These two techniques are the most
directly comparable to SEMEO.
There are other de-obfuscation tools that can be used to indirectly help with
the task SEMEO performs: a de-obfuscator can be applied, and then de-obfuscated
modules can be differenced against original unobfuscated modules. We did attempt to
apply this approach using several such tools. One tool, dex-oracle [4], looks for specific
patterns and cannot deobfuscate our programs. We also considered Androsim, which
is a commonly used Android reverse engineering tool in the Androguard toolset [15].
Androsim identifies similarities between two applications. However, when we applied
Androsim to original and obfuscated applications it misclassified many obfuscated
methods as not equivalent to their original methods. This occurred because Androsim
can handle only simple obfuscation types. We also attempted to use Simplify [5] but
it also failed to deobfuscate most methods.
In addition to the tools just discussed, there is some other work on detecting obfus-
cation types. Myles et al. [28] analyze binary code to look for similarity based on K-
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gram. However, their approach cannot handle two types of obfuscation, namely, junk
code insertion and code reordering. SAFE, which is a malware detection algorithm,
can handle simple obfuscations, like inserting NOP instructions [7]. Kruegel [24]
uses static analysis on binaries to detect kernel-level rootkits. Apposcopy [16] is a
semantics-based analysis tool to detect Android malware based on signatures. Dex-
teroid [21] is a tool that detects behavior-based malware according to the Android
life cycle model. None of these tools can analyze obfuscated code to look for semantic
equivalence.
There are also existing Android clone detection tools such as AnDarwin [11]
and DNAdroid [10]. The purpose of these clone detection tools is to detect clone
apps. As such, they are capable of working with some forms of obsfucation tech-
niques. However, they are not publicly available so we could not use them in our
studies. Symbolic semantic analysis tools can also be used to determine the semantic
equivalence of two applications. However, they do not scale well for applications in
large applications [29, 30, 33].
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future work
We have presented a technique for directly identifying (without first deobfuscating)
obfuscated methods in Android apps that are semantically equivalent to original
non-obfuscated methods. Our empirical results show that our approach, SEMEO,
can achieve a high level of recall at no loss of precision in identifying such methods.
SEMEO operates on types of obfuscation many of which are difficult to automatically
deobfuscate. Our approach is also reasonably efficient on apps consisting of no more
than 2200 methods; as such the current approach is sufficiently efficient to apply to
a large percentage of existing Android apps.
We also compared the accuracy of Semeo with that of FSquaDRA, an alterna-
tive approach for obfuscation resilient repackaged app detection. The results indicate
that Semeo is more accurate at identifying methods that have been modified. We
also evaluated the capability of Semeo to deal with ProGuard and find that it can
effectively handle obfuscation types that ProGuard utilizes. Lastly, we used Se-
meo and FSquaDRA to identify repackaged components of a version of Poke´mon Go
malware. The results indicate that Semeo can detect all modified malicious methods
while FSquaDRA mistakenly identifies over 2000 benign methods as malicious.
46
The potential benefit of our approach involves its ability to reduce the number of
methods that analysts or analysis tools must consider when searching for malicious
repackaged code, allowing them to apply their efforts more cost-effectively than would
otherwise be possible.
In future work we intend to explore methods for improving the scalability of
our approach, several approaches for which were discussed in Chapter 6. We will also
consider methods for improving the approach’s recall, particularly in cases where more
complex composite obfuscations are used. Finally, we intend to conduct additional
studies of the approach, including studies applying it to more repackaged malicious
apps.
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